The current COVID-19 pandemic is threatening the health and economic well-being of citizens across the globe and creating unprecedented difficulties and challenges for businesses. Some businesses have been forced to close temporarily or are facing dramatic reductions in business revenue and a risk of failure. Others are reworking their production lines to boost the manufacture of scarce products. Yet others are managing exceptional levels of demand and having to ensure security of supply of essential goods and services at the same time as coping with a dispersed work-force or high levels of staff absences. In order to deal with these problems, many firms are cooperating, or are contemplating cooperation, with rivals and competition agencies are being called upon to offer crucial guidance on the application of antitrust laws to such practices.

Both the US federal antitrust authorities, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (see Joint Statement, 24 March 2020), and the European Commission (see Temporary Framework Communication, 8 April 2020) have stated that, exceptionally, they will offer rapid guidance to businesses seeking clarification as to the compatibility of COVID-19-related business cooperation with competition law. Broadly, in line with similar announcements made by other authorities, these agencies have made it clear that collaborative activities between manufacturers, distributors, or purchasers (such as research and development, technical know-how or asset-sharing arrangements, information exchanges, joint production, transportation, storage, or purchasing agreements) may be compatible with competition rules where:

-   the firms are working to benefit consumers by increasing output, or overcoming shortfalls, of vital products and services (such as medication, medical equipment, transport, food, energy, and broadband); and

-   the arrangements are limited in scope and duration to that which is required during the period of the epidemic.

In particular, the European Commission has emphasized that arrangements should be necessary, proportionate, and employ temporary measures to avoid a shortage of supply. The purpose is thus to provide clarification of how existing laws, and analytical frameworks developed within them, apply in the exceptional context of the crisis which is creating unparalleled shocks and significant, short-term obstacles to the production, transportation, and distribution of crucial products and services in sufficient volumes. The same basic principles of antitrust apply, but taken against the real-world situation created by the coronavirus.

Although the US and EU authorities recognize that many businesses are responding in an exceptional and admirable way to the emergency, the purpose of the announcements is not to relax antitrust law's traditional concern for some competitor collaborations and provide a general licence to cooperation or cooperation spilling over beyond COVID-related issues into non-COVID-related ones (eg through excessive information sharing). This approach contrasts with that adopted in the USA during the Great Depression under the National Recovery Administration, which authorized and supported many industry-wide agreements or codes designed to create stability by limiting price and wage competition and restricting production and new entry. Instead, other measures are being found to support ailing businesses (such as loans and subsidies) and competition agencies are emphasizing that markets should remain competitive, eventually enabling competition to contribute to solving the economic downturn.

As in more recent, past crises (particularly following the financial one commencing in 2007), therefore, a number of competition authorities have stressed: (i) the importance of firms complying with competition law, not exploiting the situation (through cartels or price gouging); and (ii) that they will not turn a blind eye to such conduct, or allow the crisis to be used as 'a shield against competition law enforcement' (EU Commissioner Vestager). Reductions in output and price increases caused by cartels remain serious offences, which are believed to impede, not aid, recovery, increase consumer harm, and create enduring problems likely to last beyond the crisis. Past experience also establishes that, unless legally mandated or authorized (eg through an exclusion order or exemption), the fact that the parties have acted with the knowledge of, or the support from, the government does not provide a defence to competition law offences (see, eg Case C-209/07, *BIDS* EU:C:2008:643 and *United States v Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co*, 310 US 150 (1940)).

In line with this approach, agencies are making it clear that they will be vigilant, and on high alert, for cartels, recognizing that they may be enticing to firms in the current climate. First, some firms may collude to avoid 'ruinous' competition between them, and to deal with excess capacity in industries confronted with shrinking demand. Alternatively, other firms may be tempted to take advantage of augmented demand and emergency public purchasing, by engaging in bid-rigging, price-fixing, or other collusive conduct (see, eg DOJ, Preventing and Detecting Bid Rigging, Price Fixing, and Market Allocation in Post-Disaster Rebuilding Projects).

For example, the UK's Competition and Markets Authority has emphasized that it 'will not tolerate unscrupulous businesses exploiting the crisis as a "cover" for non-essential collusion' and the European Commission has stated it will actively monitor markets to detect breaches. Further, the DOJ has reminded firms that they could be prosecuted for collusion, especially where it relates to the provision of public health products (such as respirators, diagnostics, and personal health protection equipment, including face masks and sterile gloves), to government agencies---federal, state, or local. Even prior to the crisis, the DOJ had made it clear that it would increase cartel enforcement in the public procurement sphere, creating a Procurement Collusion Strike Force in November 2019 and pledging to pursue damages actions against firms engaged in anticompetitive conduct which cheats the US Government and American taxpayer (November 2018). More broadly, US agencies have committed to use the full range of their authority to combat conduct harming government procurement, including fraudulent, deceptive or corrupt practices, hoarding, or price gouging. Many agencies are also encouraging businesses, citizens, and whistle-blowers to come forward with relevant information about, or evidence of, cartels or other prohibited behaviour that comes to their attention.

These developments serve as an important reminder that competition laws continue to apply as usual even in this time of acute crisis. Indeed many competition authorities are concerned to protect the already fragile process of competition from further damage from anticompetitive practices. Although necessary collaborations between businesses that are responding positively and proportionately to address the challenges raised by COVID-19 may be looked on favourably, competition agencies are likely to pursue antitrust actions against firms, and in some jurisdictions individuals, taking advantage of the emergency by concluding cartels that exploit consumers, health services, or governments.
